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THOMAS COLE
Posed a thousand or so years ago, the question would have seemed easy,
almost insultingly so. Corax—as any Byzantine schoolboy could have told
you—was a Sicilian from Syracuse, Uie inventor of rhetoric (defined by him
as the art of persuasion). He taught his discovery to another Sicilian,
Tisias; and their doctrines (or textbooks) were later taken to Athens, perhaps
through the activity of a fellow countryman, Gorgias of Leontini, during the
course of a famous embassy there on behalf of his native city. The original
discovery was a response to the challenges of democratic politics after the
popular revolution which deposed the last of the Syracusan tyrants, Hieron's
brother Thrasybulus. Corax' s notion of persuasion as an art, capable of
being taught, and the mixture of fact, argumentation and appeals to audience
sensibilities allowed by the different parts in the canonical order of
presentation which he first devised (proem, demonstration [or narrative
followed by demonstration], epilogue), helped make public speaking an
indispensable tool in the process of guiding and controlling popular
deliberative bodies. (Guiding and controlling were Corax's specialities,
since before the revolution he had been a counsellor and close associate of
Hieron's.) The tool, however, like all tools, was subject to misuse—as
Corax found out to his own cost When he brought suit against Tisias for
refusal to pay the prearranged fee for instruction in the new art, the latter
impudently claimed that even if he lost the case he could not be held liable:
Losing the case would mean that he had failed to persuade the jury—hence
had not been taught the art of persuasion as per agreement. Corax responded
by turning the argument around against his opponent: Even an unsuccessful
prosecution would require payment, since it would show that the defendant
had in fact been taught the art, just as per agreement. At this point there
were cries of "Bad crow [corax], bad egg," on the part of jury and/or
bystanders and the case had to be dropped.
The story with minor variations appears in six texts dating from the 5th
century A.D. (Troilus' Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes) to the
13th or 14th (the Prolegomena of Maximus Planudes).^ Since there is no
^ Most fully in the Prolegomena printed as numbers 4 (anonymous) and 17
(Marcellinus?) in H. Rabe's Prolegomenon Sylloge (Leipzig 1931) and in C. Walz,
Rhetores Graeci (Stuttgart and Tubingen 1833-35) VI 4-30 and IV 1-38. The best survey
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strikingly different rival account from those ten centuries we may
conveniently call the one just presented the Byzantine answer to our initial
question about Corax.
Most modem answers reveal in varying degrees the influence of this
Byzantine prototype, but the question itself has come to seem much more
problematic. If one looks for clear traces of the story in the millennium
(roughly) between the time of Corax himself and that of his earliest
biographers, the results^ are disppointingly meagre. Plato (Phdr. 273c) is
the first writer to mention Tisias by name; Aristotle the first to know of
Corax himself (Rhet. 2. 24, 1401al7); and Theophrastus the first to
attribute to him the discovery of a new art (Radermacher 18, A. V. 17).
Dionysius of Halicamassus is the first to connect him, via Tisias, with a
prominent representative of the Athenian rhetorical tradition (Isocrates: cf.
Radermacher 29, B. II. 4). Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 2. 96) or,
conceivably, Cicero,^ is the earliest source for the lawsuit over Corax's fee.
The only notice, outside the Prolegomena and one late commentary,'* that
identifies Corax and Tisias as master and student, is from the fifth-century
Platonist Hermias (ad Phaed. 273c = p. 251. 8-9 Couvreur, though there it
is Tisias who is the master and Corax the student).^ Ammianus Marcellinus
(30. 4. 3) is the first to attribute a definition of rhetoric ("the artificer of
persuasion") to Corax or Tisias.^ Preoccupation with the politics of
of the tradition is that of S. Wilcox, "Corax and the 'Prolegomena'," AJP 64 (1943) 2 ff.
(cited hereafter by author, as are the editions of Rabe and Walz; P. Hamberger, Die
rednerische Disposition in der alien xexvTi ptixopiKTi = Rhetorische Studien II [Paderbom
1914]; G. Kowalski, De artis rhetoricae originibus [Lwow 1933] and De arte rhetorica
[Lwow 1937]; W. Stegemann. "Teisias," RE W A I [1934] 140-46; D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias
and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," CQ 34 (1940) 61-69; and L. Radermacher,
Artium scriplores [Vienna 1951]). For the versions of Troilus and Planudes see,
respectively, Rabe 5 = VI 52-54 Walz and Rabe 7 = V 212-21 Walz. (The six texU referred
to here do not include Rabe 6a = 11 682-83 Walz, or the one from which it is abridged, V 5-
8 Walz, a portion of Sopater's commentary to Hermogenes that contains the Corax-Tisias
story but nothing about the content of Corax's teaching or the nature of his pre- and post-
revolutionary political activities.)
^ Well summarized in Rabe viii-xi.
^ De or. 3. 81 (Coracem . . . patiamur . . . pullos sues excludere in nido, qui evolent
clamalores odiosi el molesti) is generally taken as an allusion to the "Bad crow, bad egg"
phrase, but Cicero did not need to be familiar with the Tisias story to apply the proverb in
this context (cf. Radermacher 29, ad B. 11. 6). Corax's chicks and the bad eggs that hatched
them could be any or all of those speakers who claimed to owe something to the tradition
of formal instruction in rhetoric thought to derive from him.
* That of Sopater (above, note 1) on Hermogenes, usually dated, like Troilus, to the
fifth century A.D.
' Spengel's Ka9TiYnTfi<; Tioio\) for the transmitted iiaBTiTfii; TioCov will "correct" the
text at this point—but need we assume that it was a copyist rather than Hermias himself
who was unfamiliar with the details of the story in its Byzantine version?
^Several Prolegomena (Radermacher 30, B. H. 13) offer the same formulation but
auribute it to oi nepi Tiaiav Kai KopaKa, by which they may be referring in a vague
way to the whole tradition which Corax and Tisias were thought to have founded. "The
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fledgling Syracusan democracy and the proper order of presentation
(dispositio, id^ic,) in an oration only comes in the Prolegomenon of
Troilus and the later works already mentioned.
Piecemeal attestation of the Byzantine tradition in earlier sources need
not mean piecemeal origin over the course of the preceding millennium, but
the possibility must obviously be reckoned with. And jx)ssibility begins to
become probability once two further phenomena are taken into
consideration—the frequency with which certain components of the
traditional account are associated with figures other than Corax, and the
contradiction between parts of the tradition and what is known from other
—
and often better—sources about early writers on rhetoric. The dispute over
payment of a fee—minus, obviously, the concluding dictum on crows and
their eggs—appears first (Apuleius, Flor. 18 = p. 30 K., Aulus Gellius 5.
10) in connection with Protagoras and his student Euathlus^ and may even
have been familiar to Plato in a Protagorean context.* "Artificer of
persuasion" is a definition of rhetoric attributed by Plato {Gorg. 453a) to
Gorgias and considered by many' to be original with Plato himself; and the
quadripartite oratorical divisio (proem, narrative [diegesis], argument
[agones], epilogue) attributed to Corax in three Prolegomena^*^ is associated
alternatively with "Isocrates and his followers" (Radermacher 160, B. XXIV.
29) or his (and Aristotle's) friend Theodectes (Aristotle, fir. 133 Rose).
The last-named bit of rhetorical doctrine is not only credited to figures
other than the "Byzantine" Corax but also—fairly clearly—much more
plausibly credited to them. It is judicial oratory, not the political persuasion
with which Corax is associated in the Byzantine tradition that requires the
Theodectean-Isocratean tetrad. Diegesis, the straightforward presentation of
the speaker's view of what has happened, is, as theoreticians from Aristotle
(Rhet. 3. 12, 1414a36-38) on down are in the habit of pointing out, likely
power of persuasion" appears as Corax's definition in Athanasius' Prolegomenon lo
Hermogenes (p. 171. 19 Rabe = Radermacher 30, B. H. 14).
^ Already known to Aristotle (fr. 67 Rose) as someone involved in a prosecution of
Protogoras; but it need not follow, as Radermacher assumes ("Studien zur Geschichte der
griechischen Rhetorik 1: Timaeus und die Ueberlieferung iiber den Ursprung der Rhetorik,"
Rh. Mas. 52 [1897] 413), that the case involved payment of a fee (see Rabe xi).
* Prougoras' sutement. at the end of the long speech ascribed to him in the Protagoras
(324b-c), that any student who feels the fee charged for his course of instruction to have
been excessive can go to a temple and, upon swearing an oath, pay no more than what he
declares the instruction to have been worth, suggests the possibility that disagreement
over the payment and proper amount of fees was either a subject considered by Protagoras
himself or one that provided the content of stories told about him—as would be natural in
the case of the man who either was, or was thought to be (Diog. Laert. 9. 52), the first
person to teach in return for pay.
' See H. Mutschmann, "I>ie alteste Definition der Rhetorik," Hermes 53 (1918) 440-
43, who cites the parallel Platonic formulations at Charm. 174e (medicine as wyieia^
Stijiioupyoc;) and Symp. 188d (prophecy as cpiX-iaq Gecov Kai avGpomcov 6TmiowpY6(;).
^°Rabe 7. p. 67. 6-7 = V 215. 22-23 Walz; Rabe 9, p. 126. 5-15 = H 119. 10-26
Walz; Rabe 13, p. 189. 16-17 = VH 6. 9-10 Walz.
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to be unnecessary in a political case, where the audience is assumed to be
well aware of the facts of the situation.'^ The one author (Rabe 4, pp. 25.
17-26. 6 = VI 13. 1-11 Walz) who does attribute to Corax a divisio
(proem, argument, epilogue) suited to political oratory writes as if he had
begun with the judicial tetrad and then combined its second and third
members into what counts as a single section dedicated to agones, but whose
purpose is narrative as well: nepl wv E6ei o-uuPcuXeveiv xw by\\Ji<o
Xiyew ox; ev SiTiYnoet -^^
The same incompatibility exists between the Byzantine version of
Corax's activity and Cicero's summary report (Brut. 46-48 = Radermacher
13-14, A. V. 9) of what he claims^^ to have been the account of Corax and
Tisias that appeared in Aristotle's famous compendium—the Synagoge
Technon—of early writings on rhetoric. There the new art is linked in a
totally different way to conditions at Syracuse following the fall of the
tyrants. Is is not the requirements of democratic debate that inspire Corax
and Tisias, but lawsuits over property, once the original owners began to
claim land confiscated by the tyrants and then given or sold by them to
others {cum sublatis . . . tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis
repeterentur). This account—whether or not it corresponds to anything in
Syracusan history—certainly accords better than the Byzantine one with the
testimony of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who complain consistently that
writers on public speaking concentrate on dicanic oratory to the total or
nearly total exclusion of pohtical oratory.^'* And the one Byzantine account
of Corax (V 5-8 Walz, from Sopater's Hermogenes commentary) that fails
to assign him any role in politics^ ^ is also the only one that contains a
passage (V 6. 20-24) close enough in phraseology and organization of
material to Brut. 46 to suggest the possibility of derivation from a
common, Aristotelian source:
^^ When narrative is included in the divisio of political orations (see, for example,
Anaximenes (?), Rhet. ad Alex. 30-31 and Syrianus, in Hermogenem 11 170. 14-19 Rabe),
it tends to be conceived as limited in scope (as in Anaximenes' rules for reporting an
embassy) or tendentious in character (the katastasis of imf>erial rhetoricians—see below,
note 43).
^^ That tripartition in this passage derives in some sense from an original quadripartion
is very likely even if, as Wilcox argues (15-16), its author here preserves the Byzantine
tradition in its original form. In replacing the triad with a tetrad or some other scheme
suitable only to judicial oratory, later writers would have been simply spelling out what
was impUcit in their model.
^^ On the general accuracy of the claim, see—against the doubts of Solmsen (Gnomon
26 [1954] 218)—A. E. Douglas. "The AristoteUan Synagoge Technon after Cicero flru/i«
46-48," Utomus 14 (1955) 536-39.
See Hamberger 12-16, with the concurring judgments of Hinks 62-63 and
Stegemann 143-44.
" Corax's political role is also missing from Rabe 6a = 11 682-83 Walz, but that text is
simply an abridgement of Sopater.
Thomas Cole 69
turn primum [after the fall of the
Sicilian tyrants] . . . artem et
pragggpta Siculos Coracem et
Tisiam conscripsisse: nam an -
tea neminem solitum via nee
arte, sed accurate tamen et de
scripto plerosque dicere
^£Ta 5e Ta^)Ta [the age of the
tyrants] Kopg^ Tiprnxov d-
ndvt(ov ovveaxTioaTo 5i -
SpcoKq^igv nepl pTitopiKfi(;.
ol ydp npb a{)-to\) ETcifq-
Sevovxeq ttiv xexvriv ax;
£^rt£lpla Tivl Ktti eni^xeXEia
Xpco)j.Evoi eJiexTiSe-uov, koI
ovxcaq*^ Hev oi. ^i^m M::^fil)
KOI aixiac ovbixi'
—as do the similar lists of fifth- and fourth-century rhetoricians that follow,
both in this account and in Cicero:
isque fuisse et paratas a
Protagora . . . disputationes
qui nunc communes appellantur
loci; quod idem fecisse Gorgias
. . . huic Antiphontem Rha-
nmusium similia quaedam habu-
isse conscripta quo neminem
umquam melius oravisse capitis
causam . . . scripsit Thucydi -
des : nam Lysiam primo pro-
fiteri solitum artem esse dicen-
di, deinde . . . artem remo-
visse; similiter Isocrates . . .
se ad artes componendas trans-
tulisse.
Brutus 47^8
xo-uxov 5e xov K6paKO(;
Tioiac; yeyove ^a9TlXT|(; . ,
.
Kttl ropYia(; 6 Aeovxivo(;
Koxd Tcpeopeiav eXBojv
'A9T|VTiai XT]v XEXvnv g-oy -
ypacpeigav nap' avxov eko-
jiiOEv KOI avxoq EXEpav
7ipoo£9r|K£ Kal (J.EX* av>x6v
'






pTixcop . . .
V 6. 24-7. 14 Walz
(Note that both lists end, as one would expect in Aristotle, with Isocrates
—
not, as in the Prolegomena [Rabe 17, p. 273. 18-22 = IV 15. 17-20 Walz;
Rabe 4, p. 28. 12-16 = VI 15. 19-16. 2 Walz], with the Hellenistic canon
of Attic orators.'*)
ouTcoq (Radermacher) or ovxoi (Gercke) seems a necessary emendation for the
transmitted ovtot;, which would make ot) jiexd xexvTiq a description of Corax's own
method and leave the nature of the contrast with earlier "empirical" rhetoricians
completely unclear.
' The parallel (first pointed out by A. Gercke, "Die alte Texvn prixopiKTi und ihre
Gegner," Hermes 32 [1897] 344-45) would, of course, be more compelling were it
possible to get any sense out of de scripto (often emended, not very satisfactorily, to
descriple) in Cicero's text or from the equally puzzling Kal aixiaq in Sopater. In general,
however, scholars have given it less attention than it deserves.
^* The value of the parallels is not lessened by the illegitimate conclusions which
Bamberger sought to draw from them (below, note 40). It would certainly be less if, as is
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The difficulty of accommodating the "non-Sopatran," political Corax
within either his immediate (textual) or larger (historical) context poses the
problems raised thus far in their acutest form. One has the choice of
radically recasting his role, or largely rejecting the entire Prolegomena
tradition. Scholars in this century have opted, by and large, for the first
alternative. There is widespread agreement on jettisoning everything we are
told about the biography of Corax: both his preoccupation, before and after
the revolution, with political manipulation and persuasion (incompatible
with the divisio he is said to have devised and with fourth-century testimony
about the overwhehningly dicanic orientation of early writing on rhetoric)''
and his lawsuit with Tisias (a floating story of indeterminate origin
eventually attached to Corax because "Bad crow, bad egg" provided such an
effective piece of closure).^^ The relationship between Corax and Tisias
thereby becomes the purely generic one between two collaborators. The
former is to be credited with a discussion of persuasive techniques organized
and presented in the order in which they would appear in a "normal" dicanic
speech of four (or more—see below) parts; the latter with expanding and
improving the collection, or perhaps, in the event Corax 's teaching was
purely oral, with setting it down for the first time in writing. The second
hypothesis has the advantage of explaining a further inconsistency between
the Byzantine Corax and his predecessors. There is no hint, at any point
before Hermias and the Prolegomena, of contrasting characters or separate
generally assumed (cf., for example, Wilcox 9-10), the lines (V 7. 15-18 Walz)
immediately following in Sopater maintained—against Aristotle and all other fourth-
century sources—that the rhetorical works of Corax, Tisias and their immediate successors
were exclusively concerned with political oratory. But what the lines in fact say is that
these works were 6TmaY(0YiKal texvai, devoting no space to stasis theory and
preoccupied with ni9av6TTiTO(; . . . tivoc;, nox; 5ei 6fip.ov vnayayiaQai. Since there
is, so far as I know, no parallel for demagogikos as a synonym for demigorikos or
symbouleutikos, the normal adjectives used in reference to political oratory, it is perfectly
possible that the word means nothing more here than "popular" or "calculated to appeal to
a large audience" {iinayarfnioc, xov 6fmo«, as the phrase immediately following might
suggest) whether in a popular law court or a popular assembly. If so, there is a possible
parallel—^and a further argument for derivation from the Synagoge—to the contrast drawn in
Aristotle's Rhetoric between the author's own conception of the discipline and that of his
predecessors. Aristotelian rhetoric is centered around the study of the enlhymeme; that of
his predecessors is directed at the akroates and framed with his shortcomings (mochthe'ria,
phortikotes,phaulotes) in mind {Rhet. 2. 21, 1395bl-2; 3. 1, 1404a8; 3. 14, 1415b5; 3.
18, 1419al8). What app>ears in Sopater may be nothing more than a "Hermogenized" and
simplified version of this contrast Enthymeme study is Hermogenized into stasis theory
(compare Rhet. 1. 1, 1354al4-15 nepi . . . evBwfiimdTOJv o«5ev XcYovoi with
Sopater's oil6ev nepl otdaecov exowoai Ke(pdX,aiov, both in reference to the same body
of texts); and Aristotle's intellectually limited audience {akroatai phauloi) is presented,
more simply, as a lower-class one {demos).
" G. Kennedy is virtually alone among contemporary writers in his inclination to
make Corax "a political speaker" and attribute to him "a division of speech suitable to
deliberative oratory" {The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece [Princeton 1963] 60-61).
^Cf. Kowalski 1937. 47.
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achievements for Corax and Tisias. We are always told what Tisias did (and
taught),^^ or what Corax did,^^ or (beginning with Cicero in the De
oratoreY^ what Tisias and Corax did—never what Corax, unlike Tisias, did,
or the different things which each of them did.^'* The two figures seem to
have been interchangeable—so much so that, as pointed out earlier, they are
in fact interchanged in Hermias' text, the only one (outside the
Prolegomena) which refers to them explicitly as master and student. This
suggests that the ultimate source of all our information was a single report
or a single set of documents in which the contributions of the two men were
not clearly distinguished from each other.
So far the new consensus. A minority of scholars, however, among
them the one to whose memory this collection of essays is dedicated, has
explored, at least tentatively, the first, more radical alternative suggested
above. In 1934 Friedrich Solmsen drew attention^^ to a "wichtiges, nicht
genug ausgewertetes Zeugnis" of Aristotle concerning the character of "the
art [of rhetoric] before Theodorus." According to Rhet. 2. 24, 1400bl5-16,
a certain type of argument from probability constituted "the entirety" of this
art inaocL y\ npotepov xot) 6Eo5cbpov xe/vTi). Since Theodorus was the
second after Tisias in the canonical succession of early writers on rhetoric,
the statement, if true, makes it highly unlikely that Corax or Tisias dealt
with anything but the proofs section of the four-part oration. Any kind of
argumentation from probability {eikos) is largely excluded from the narrative
21 Plato. Phdr. 261a, 273c, AristoUe. Soph. El. 32, 183b29. Theophrastus {ap.
Radermacher 18. A. V. 17).
22 Aristotle. Rhet. 2. 24. 1402al7. "Aristotle" in the anonymous preface to the
spurious Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Cicero. De inv. 2. 2. 6.
23
1. 91; cf. Brut. 46.
2* Teioiaq (lexa xovq np(ic>xo\)<; heads Aristotle's list of contributors to the
development of rhetoric at Soph. El. 32. 183b29 ff.. and Corax is sometimes assumed
(e.g.. by Hinks 65-66) to be included among, or identified with, the npcotowq. If so.
Aristotle may be implying some sort of contrast between Corax's achievements and the
more solid or clearly identifiable ones of his successor. But it is much more likely that the
npokoi are Empedocles (called the inventor of the discipline in Aristotle's Sophist [fr. 65
Rose = Rademiacher 28. B. I. 1] and/or the divine patrons or mythical masters of effective
speech—Henmes, Nestor, Odysseus—with whom the Prolegomena regularly begin and who
probably played some role even in fourth-century accounts (Wilcox 8. with note 10) of the
pre-history of the discipline: cf. Crat. 407e (Hermes), 398d (Greek iipcoe(; so called
because they were pr|topeq tivei; Kal ipanr\z\.Koi, Phdr. 261b (Nestor, Odysseus.
Palamedes). and for what may be a distant echo of one of Aristotle's own formulations,
Quintilian 3. 1. 8: primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen
dicitur Empedocles. G. Kennedy ("The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer," AJP 78
[1957] 23 ff.) regards the last passage quoted as Quintilian's own attempt to strike a
compromise between those who categorically affirmed, and those who categorically
denied, the existence of rhetoric in the age of the heroes; but this sort of compromise is
typically Aristotelian. If primitive maxims and proverbs can count as philosophy (fr. 13
Rose = De philos. fr. 8 Ross), one would expect primitive eloquence and figures of speech
to count as rhetoric.
25
"Theodorus." RE \ A2 (1934) 1842^4; cf. Hinks 68-69.
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of a speech, and rarely if ever forms part of a proem or epilogue.^^ This,
combined with Tisias' general addiction, well attested in Plato (Phdr. 267a,
272e, 273c-d) to Eikostechnik, and Theodorus' equally well attested {Phdr.
266d; Arist. Rhet. 3. 13, 1414bl3-15) obsession with subdividing
oratorical structures into their component parts (narrative, preparatory
narrative, supplementary narrative, proof, supplementary proof,
supplementary refutation, etc.) naturally points to the strong possibility that
the entire topic of oratorical divisio was Theodorus' innovation.^^
Solmsen's general doubts about the modem consensus—though not his
views on Theodorus—were seconded several years later by Kroll,^* and they
have been carried a step further in two works completed in 1990—E.
Schiappa's "The Beginnings of Greek Rhetorical Theory"^^ and my own The
Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece?^ The starting point for both
investigations is the contention—advanced as a surmise by me,^^ proved in
so far as such things can ever be proved by Schiappa^-^—that the word
"rhetoric" (first attested in the Gorgias) is Plato's own term, coined
sometime in the 380s, for a set of techniques not thitherto seen as
constituting a separate, definable discipline. Schiappa argues the
unlikelihood of Tisias' having come up with anything like the systematic
presentation of rhetorical techniques or theories which the notion of a
definite art of rhetorike suggests, and is inclined to doubt the tradition which
^^ Solmsen's own conclusion is more cautious, allowing for the possibility that there
were pre-Theodoran discussions of other parts of the speech but that Aristotle chose to
ignore them here because he is using lechne to mean "der eigentUche Inhalt der Texvtiq"
—
i.e., enthymeme or Argumenlationstechnik. But he cites no parallel for this use of techne'
when what is meant is merely to evxejcvov vt\<^ xexvTi^.
^^ Solmsen's conclusion follows for Corax and Tisias even if, as I think rather more
likely, x\ npotepov tov 6eo6copo\) Texvri is a reference, not to "the art of rhetoric before
Theodorus," but to "the earlier art of Theodorus," i.e., an earlier work of Theodorus written
before the interest in divisio for which he was famous became apparent (cf. the variant
reading npoxepa, which would, of course, require that the phrase be so translated). This
interpretation, unlike Solmsen's, does not eliminate the possibility that divisio was
already a concern of Thrasymachus, Tisias' immediate follower in the sequence of early
writers on rhetoric; but whatever the situation was with him, such concern is excluded for
Corax by Aristotle's further observation {Rhet. 2. 24, 1402a 17) a propos of another type
of argument from probability, that it was "what the art of Corax is composed of
{synkeimene).
2* In "Rhetorik," RE Suppl. 7 (1940) 1046. The general difficulty of reconciling
Corax's Eikostechnik and his supposed preoccupation with dispositio was first pointed
out, to my knowledge, by W. Siiss, Ethos: Studien zur dlteren griechischen Rhetorik
(LeiDzig and Berlin 1910) 74.
^^To appear in D. Zarefsky (ed.). Rhetorical Movement: Essays in Honor of LelandM.
Griffin (Evanston 1992).
^" Baltimore 1991. See, especially. Chapter 5, with the works of the earlier scholars
(Gercke, Radenmacher, Lesky, Barwick, Koch, Havelock) cited in nn. 11-12. To that list
(on pp. 168-69), add Kowalski 1933. 37-38 and 44; Kowalski 1937, 85; and Solmsen's
review of Radermacher (above, note 13) 214-15.
^1 Origins (previous note) 2 and 98-99.
^2
"Did Plato Coin Rhe'torikel" AJP 120 (1989) 460-73.
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credits him with a written rhetorical handbook. My own reconstruction
accepts the existence of the handbook but posits a collection of model
pieces, analogous to those found in the Tetralogies of Antiphon and based
on the principle of eikos: pleadings pro and con (or, more likely,
compressed summary versions of such pleadings) on topics likely to come
up in court cases—not an analytic set of precepts. The famous pair of
arguments (associated with Tisias at Phaedrus 273b3-c4 and Corax at Arist.
Rhet. 2. 24, 1402al8-21), in which a defendant's superior strength is
adduced to establish first the likelihood and then the unlikelihood of his
being guilty of having assaulted the plaintiff as charged, will have come
from this collection—and perhaps the debate over non-payment of a
teacher's fee as well.^^ Though not based on probability, the latter
illustrates a similar process of turning an argument around against its
original propounder.
My own reconstruction is less radical than Schiappa's and, unlike
Schiappa or the Byzantine tradition or the modified version of it which
constitutes the modem "consensus," it is compatible with all the fifth- and
fourth-century evidence.^ But neither reconstruction addresses itself to the
problem of how and why the Byzantine tradition came into being in the first
place. A partial explanation has been suggested by some of the architects of
the modem consensus, but their arguments must be carried further if the de-
Byzantinization process under way here is really to work.
It is generally agreed that the transfer of the activity of Corax from the
dicanic to the political sphere is a post-Aristotelian development in tjie
tradition, and it is fairly easy to see why the transfer took place. Political
rhetoric, in the view of Isocrates (Antid. 46, Paneg. 4), followed here by
Aristotle (Rhet. 1. 1, 1354bl7 ff.), is a higher, more significant form than
dicanic; that it should replace dicanic rhetoric in the discipline's foundation
myth was almost inevitable once the view of Isocrates became authoritative,
and once rhetoric itself had ceased to be, as it often was for Plato and
Aristotle, a suspect discipline whose claims were to be disputed or curtailed,
and had become, along with philosophy, the central ingredient in higher
education. Its finest achievements were expected, quite naturally, to be
^^ Poterat in arte sua . . . Tisias . . . ingenii ostendandi causa jieXexaq componere in
quibus talia perlustrarent unde ad ipsum auctorem fabula translata videatur (L. Spengel,
Artium scriptores [Stuttgart 1828] 33-34). Cf. Kowalski 1933, 43.
^* For those portions of the evidence that are usually uken (erroneously, I believe) to
point to the existence of organized collections of rhetorical precepts before the handbook
of Theodectes and the earliest version of Aristotle's Rhetoric, see Origins (above, note 30)
130-33. One possible testimony not discussed there is POxy 410 (= Radermacher 231-
32, D) an analysis, in Doric, of stylistic megaloprepeia, which its first editor believed to
be "considerably influenced by Tisias* xexvTi" or even taken from a summary of the
"productions of Tisias and his school" (cf. W. Rhys Roberts, "The New Rhetorical
Fragment in Relation to the Sicilian Rhetoric of Corax and Tisias," CR 18 [1904] 18-21).
But with the exception of Drerup (cf. Stegemann 142), Roberts' view has found no
followers.
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present, at least in nucleo, in the work of its protos heuretes', and it is even
possible that Corax's role in controlling and directing the passions of the
Syracusan populace has arisen, ultimately, through a transfer into a
particular historical situation of the civilizing, organizing role in the pre-
history of the human race which certain laudatory texts assign either to
eloquence (Isocrates 3. 6-9) or the first person to master it (Cicero, De inv.
\.1.2,Deor. 1. 30 ff.).
A similar tendency to attribute everything that was basic in the
discipline to its founder will explain why Corax came to be credited with
the—ultimately—canonical Gorgianic or Platonic definition of rhetoric as
the power or artificer of persuasion. Having invented for the benefit of his
contemporaries the art of rhetoric, it was inevitable that Corax should have
told them in briefest possible compass what it was.
It is impossible to pinpoint the period(s) or author(s) in which Corax
began undergoing this metamorphosis, though Timaeus of Tauromenium
—
our earliest authority (cf. D. H. De Lys. 1, p. 11.3 Us.-Rad.) for Gorgias'
embassy to Athens—has often been suggested as its ultimate source.^^ The
shifts involved, whether of scope (from minor achievement to major), venue
(from courtroom to popular assembly) or narrative mode (from history to
fiction) certainly point to the work of someone who, like Timaeus, was
simultaneously Sicilian patriot, Sicilian "democrat"^^ and, if Polybius is to
be believed, congenital liar.
On the other hand, neither patriotism nor republicanism nor general
mendacity will explain Timaeus' concern with the technicalities of divisio,
and he does not in fact figure in the modem consensus in this connection.
The assumption is, rather, that one at least of the various divisiones (four in
all) attributed to the Byzantine Corax must be an isolated remnant of the real
Corax, faithfully recorded in Aristotle Synagoge, but later transferred
inappropriately from its original dicanic context into a political one.
There is little justification, however, for the separation thus posited
between one aspect of Corax's traditional role 2is a protos heuretes and all the
others. Like all the others, this aspect is missing from the one Byzantine
text (above, pp. 68-69) which shows a close verbal parallel to Cicero's
summary of the Synagoge. More important, the tetradic divisio encountered
in three Prolegomena (above, pp. 67-68) is so canonical a feature of ancient
rhetoric as a whole that it can, when linked to a listing of the presumed
'^ Radennacher (above, note 7) 412-19. followed by Hamberger 12-18 and Wilcox 20-
23. Rabe ix and Schiappa (above, note 29) n. 51 remain unconvinced, perhaps with good
reason: see text. p. 70.
^^ I.e.. anti-monarchist, as may be inferred from his hatred of Agathocles. Wilcox (21-
22) draws attention to the close parallels between Rabe 4. p. 25. 3-8 = VI 12. 6-10 Walz
(the vowing of a cult in honor of Zeus eleulherios to be instituted once the dynasty of
Hieron is expelled from Syracuse) and Diodorus' account, in a passage often thought to
derive from Timaeus. of the actual institution of the cult after the expulsion had taken place
(11. 72-73).
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tasks (erga) or purposes of each of its four parts, function as a kind of
alternative or supplementary definition. Rhetoric is the artificer of
persuasion and, more particularly, the art of "proemizing" for good will and
attentiveness, narrating for clarity and believability, arguing for proof and
refutation, and "epilogizing" for summary and reminder (or perorating for
pathos). To say that Corax invented rhetoric was tantamount to saying that
he invented this four-fold way of conceiving his task and implementing its
operation. The ease with which definition can become foundation myth is
particularly clear in Rabe 9, pp. 125. 22-126. 18 = II 119. 18-29 Walz,
which first describes how Corax produced his rhetorical inventions:
. . . <paaiv evpexTiv npcoxov yeveoGai tov Kopaxa . . . tov
Sfjuov . . . a\iyKExv\iivov ehpovxa Kai iva iiev to GopvPovv
jiavoTi Ktti ireioTi Ttpoaexc^v [1] "^ohq tojv npooi^icov xonovc,
ejiivoT|cavxa- iva 5e Kai nepi xov jtpdYnaxo(; aa(pg>(; 5i5d^Ti xai
niQavoic, [2] ... xfiv 6ir|Yriaiv eniKaxavoTiavTa- iva 6e Kai
. . . JLLULU KOI d7roxpe\|/Ti [3] xoiq dycboi xpilod^i£vov • iva 6e
. . .
dva^vrjOTi nXr\p(0OT\ 5e Kai xov noQovc, [4] ... Kai xovq
e7tiX6YO\)(; KaxaoxTiod|ievov,
and then goes on to add
xiveq Se paoiv epya xf[C, prixopiKTiq eivai x6 7ipooi|iidoao0ai
npoc, Evvoiav fi Tcpogoxtiv r\ £\>)j.d6£iav [1], x6 5iTiYf|aaa6ai
npbc, aa<pf|VEiav [2], x6 npbq nioxiv dYcovioaoGai [3], x6 npbc,
dvdfiVTioiv ETciXoYioaoGai [4],
which is practically identical with the same author's formulation (Rabe 4, p.
32. 6-9 = VI 19. 5-8 Walz) of the Theodectean (above, p. 67) tetrad:
Jlpool^ldoa0Gal npbq Evvoiav [1], 5niYiloaaGai npbc, TtiGavo-
XTixa [2], dYwvioaoGai npbq dn65Ei^iv [3], dvaKE<paXai(6oaoGai
npbc; dvd^-VTiaiv [4].'^^
It is just conceivable that the reverse process has occurred, and the definition
has been generated from a genuine tradition about Corax's divisio. But this
is highly improbable, given the fact that, though the divisio is basic to the
organization of the third book of his Rhetoric, Aristotle never suggests that
it is the work of any one writer from an earlier generation.
'''r: Aristotle, fr. 133 Rose. Cf. the alternative formulation in Rabe 13, p. 216. 1-4 =
Vn 33. 5-7 Walz: npooijiidaaoGai npoq evvoiav [1], 8iTiYr|aaa9ai npoq
niSavoTTiTa [2], nioToooaoOai npoq nei6a> [3], eniXoYioaaBai npoq 6pYT\v r\ 'iXtow
[4]. The same definitional tetrad may be used equally well to produce an anti -foundation
myth—cf. Cicero's contention (ascribed to the Academic Chamiadas at De or. 1. 90) that it
is ridiculous to posit a protos heuretes for rhetoric, since it was perfectly within the
capacity erf anyone of us, as normal human beings, to blandire [\]et rem gestam exponere
[2] et id quod intenderemus confirmare et quod contra diceretur refellere [3], ad exlremum
deprecari et conqueri [4], quibus in rebus omnis oratorum versaretur facultas. Quintilian
makes the same point more briefly at 2. 17. 6.
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What applies to the "historicization" of the Theodectean tetrad will also
apply to the triadic divisio attributed to Corax in one of the Prolegomena.
The latter, as was pointed out (above, p. 68), seems to have arisen through
the minimal change necessary to accommodate the tetrad to a political
context. The same cannot be said, however, for the pentadic and heptadic
divisiones found in two of the Prolegomena: proem, narrative, agones,
parekbasis (digression)^* and epilogue (Rabe 17 [Marcellinus?], pp. 270.
22-271. 20 = IV 12. 17-13. 19 Walz), or the same, with narrative called
katastasis instead of diegesis, and with the insertion of proparaskeue
(preliminary presentation) and prokatastasis (preliminary narrative) between
it and the proem (Rabe 5 [Troilus], p. 52. 8-20 = VI 49. 1-20 Walz). It is
clear that both Troilus' heptad and Marcellinus' pentad result from insertions
into a tradition that elsewhere derives from the same source as do the
Prolegomena with a briefer divisio. The extra parts required to produce them
are simply named and defined, with no effort, as there is for the four parts
shared with the other divisio, to indicate the purpose which they serve in the
process of political persuasion (digression and proparaskeue are assigned a
purely dicanic function [see below], and prokatastasis has the merely formal
one of preparing the way for the katastasis itselQ. But what is to guarantee
that this different source is a later source? The tetradic divisio itself may be
an insertion into a tradition that originally contained the triadic adaptation of
it found in one text (above, p. 68, with note 12); only its widespread use
elsewhere and the existence of independent testimony linking it to
Theodectes prevents us from seriously entertaining the possibility that its
ultimate source is Corax himself. Since the pentad and heptad are so rarely
encountered,^' the most economical explanation for their presence in the
Prolegomena is that one or the other of them derives from a genuine report
or memory of the actual content of Corax 's text.''^
^* The reading in all but one of the passages where this section is mentioned and
presumably to be read there (p. 52. 14-15 Rabe = VI 49. 8 Walz) in place of the transmitted
parekthesin.
'' The heptad only in Troilus and the set of confuse annexae . . . definitiones,
divisiones, interprelationes (Rabe Ixiii) adjoined in one set of manuscripts (cf. p. 212.
17-19 Rabe = VII 25. 8-10 Walz) to what now appears as Rabe 13. For the pentad, see
text. p. 79.
*° The seven parts of Troilus, in particular, "are to a certain degree recommended by
their singularity," whereas "the four canonical . . . partes orationis we suspect just
because we should expect to find them referred back to the inventor of the Art" (Hinks 68).
Hinks, like several others, seems imable either to accept, or find decisive considerations
against, the authenticity (argued at length in Hamburger, 31-38) of Troilus' heptad. Cf.
Radermacher 34, ad B. U. 23 {ea . . .fortasse ex Aristolele provenit memoria,scimus
autem in terrmnis technicis inveniendis primes auctores quasi delirasse) and Stegemann
146. Hamberger has, however, found no followers (cf. Hinks 68) in his attempt (7-8 and
31 ff.) to establish an Aristotelian origin for the context within which the hepud appears.
(The argument rests on supposed parallels with the remarks on the beginnings of rhetoric
in Sopater's scholia to Hermogenes [V 5-8 ff. Walz], the only late rhetorical text which
has been thought [see text, pp. 68-69] to contain close echoes of the Synagcge Technm.)
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Though the possibility can obviously not be excluded, it seems to me
to be, on balance, a fairly unlikely one. There is no reason to disbelieve
Cicero when he says (De inv. 2. 2. 6) that Aristotle's Synagoge drove all
the works it summarized out of circulation. Authentic notice of a five- or
seven-part system of Corax would have had to be taken directly from some
Aristotelian Mittelquelle, and then reinserted by Troilus and Marcellinus
into an account derived indirectly—^via Timaeus or whoever—from the same
Aristotelian source. And it is hard to see any reason either for the original
division of the two transmissions—direct and indirect—or their later
reunification.
There are, moreover, clear difficulties in both the pentadic and heptadic
divisiones which make it unlikely that either could ever have been intended
as the basic organizing system for a course of practical instruction in public
speaking. Digression (parekbasis) as defined by both Troilus and
Marcellinus is an excursus on the prior life of the accused (dtTioSei^vv
. .
.
xo\> Kpivop,evov p{o\) [Troilus] ~ ttjv Tipotepav xox> ivayo\iivo\}
Siaycoyriv [Marcellinus]) designed to ensure conviction even if the case
immediately at hand fails to do so. As such it is relevant to only half the
judicial cases—those for the prosecution—with which the student is likely
to be confronted. As if to correct this fault the longer divisio of Troilus
balances parekbasis with an exact counterpart the proparaskeue, dedicated to
removing a (presumably) preexisting charge that is doing the speaker harm
(ahiav Xx>Tio\>(5a\ avxov). The result, however, is a model oration plan
which by virtue of including both proparaskeue and parekbasis presupposes
a speech that is simultaneously for the prosecution and for the defense. We
seem to be dealing with a tradition that is Byzantine in more ways than
one."*^
Comparable difficulties attend the katastasis and prokatastasis in the
heptadic divisio. Both terms are well attested in the imperial rhetoricians,
but Troilus* definition of the former (\|/iXtiv twv 7cpax9evtcov ekGeow)
makes it exactly what the imperial katastasis is not. Bare narrative is
regularly diegesis, katastasis being the term used when some sort of
slanting, or coloring, or skewing is called for.''^ Troilus' point of departure
may have been the tradition, attested in a single source (Syrianus in
Hermogenem 2, p. 127. 4 Rabe = Radermacher 35, B. II. 24) that katastasis
*^ A section, toward the beginning of a speech for the defense, countering aitiai of the
sort Troilus refers to is frequent enough, both in fourth-centuiy oratory and fourth-century
rhetoric: cf. the suggestions for dealing with diabolai in Arist. Rhet. 3. 15 and
Anaximenes (?), Rhet. ad Alex. 29, pp. 61. 11-64. 23 Fuhrmann. But Hamberger's
attempt (105 ff.) to detect its presence in the three earliest surviving pieces of fifth-century
oratory (Antiphon 1, 5 and 6) seems to me to involve an artificial Gliederung which
isolates from their surroundings sections that in two cases are better taken with the
introduction, and in the third with the narrative.
*^See D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge 1983) 88, with n. 6, and Kowalski
1933. 45-50.
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was Corax's word for "proem." He reconciles this with the usage with
which he was more familiar by assuming that Corax must have recognized
two subspecies: a "proemic" or "pro-"katastasis (cf. his definition:
eioPoXriv Kal apxT|v Kal npooC^iov . . . ercl tt^v Kaxdaxaoiv) and a
"diegetic" katastasis, which he inaccurately identifies with what went by that
name among his own contemporaries. Whether the tradition about Corax
that inspired this subdivision was correct or not, Troilus' use of it tells us
nothing about the original organization of Corax's text.'*^
Even granting, however, that the divisiones including prokatastasis,
parekbasis and proparaskeue are unlikely to be much older than the texts in
which they are attested, one may still wonder what impelled their authors to
seek out a five- or seven-part system in the first place. A possibility worth
considering is that Troilus and Marcellinus were influenced here by another
multi-partite classification which they share, and which appears nowhere
else in the Prolegomena. Both authors present their account of Corax's
invention of rhetoric as an illustration of the way any act of creation can be
described and accounted for in terms of the particular "determining
circumstances" (peristatika) that accompany it. These are five in number:
the where, when, who, why and how of its coming into being. In the case
of rhetoric the "where" is Sicily, the "when" the period following the fall of
the tyrants, the "who" Corax, Uie "why" the desire to control the process of
popular decision-making, the "how" the five or seven parts of an oration. It
is conceivable, therefore, that the number of subdivisions in the "how" was
regulated at some point in the development of the tradition in such a way as
to make it equal to the number oi peristatika. The suggestion is supported
by the fact that Troilus actually mentions—though he does not accept—
a
variant list of seven peristatika (pp. 51. 26-52. 2 Rabe = VI 48. 22-25
Walz) which would match his own heptadic divisio, and refrains—as if
*^ If katastasis was in fact the word Corax used for the first part of a speech, it may have
been used, along with agones (the only other piece of terminology in the passages on
divisio under examination here that has a fifth-century ring about it), to refer to the
essential recurring components of the sort of collection of model pieces which, it was
suggested in the text (p. 73), Corax produced. Arguments pro and con (agones) would have
to be preceded in every instance by a "setting up" (katastasis) of the basic facts of the
situation which the arguments presupposed (cf., in the most famous collection of model
rhetorical pieces surviving from antiquity, the two- or three-line settings of the stage
which introduce individual items in the Controversiae of Seneca, and—for the fifth-century
texts which support this meaning of katastasis—Origins [above, note 30] 83, with n. 14).
Later usage may derive from the meaning suggested here, normally identifying katastasis
(as what precedes the argumenu section of a speech) with the die'gesis, but occasionally (as
what begins a speech) with the proem (cf. Rhet. ad Alex. 29, pp. 64. 24 and 65. 9
Fuhrmann). Like Troilus. the author of Rabe 15, p. 247. 21-22 = VH 43. 1-2 Walz (td
. . . npoo{^ia KataoTaTiKot xow dycivoq XxxjiPdvonev) may be attempting to reconcile
the two senses, but through elimination of the die'gesis rather than addition of a proemic
katastasis.
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seeking to avoid a clash with the five peristatika he does accept—from ever
explicitly mentioning the number of parts in that divisio.^
The longer list oi peristatika is derived from the shorter (by including,
illogically , raw material [hyle] and product [pragma] among the peristatika
that attend the conversion of the one into the other); and the same may hold
true, as was suggested earlier, for the longer list of speech parts:
Proparaskeue is a parekbasis for the defense, and prokatastasis is produced by
mating the katastasis attributed to Corax with its imperial counterpart. As
for the shorter list, parekbasis would have been a natural candidate for
inclusion once the original decision to convert the standard tetradic divisio
into a pentad had been made. It is the extra ingredient—a digressio
comprising an orationem a causa atque iudicationem remotam introduced
between argument and conclusion''^—in the five-part system best known to
Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic writers, that of Hermagoras (F 22a-d
Matthes); and it might have been considered a speech part with which Corax
had a special affinity. Small wonder—so the reasoning would have gone
—
if the creator of a tradition stigmatized by Aristotle for dwelling on ta exo
tou pragmatos*^ decided, once he had devised the four-part system, that there
was still need for a special spot in each speech set aside exclusively for such
irrelevancies.'*^
Other reconstructions are obviously possible, but their possibility does
not in itself justify tracing the five- and seven-part oratorical models found
in the Prolegomena to anything but some sort of later variant on the four-
part form that characterizes most of the tradition. The modem consensus
that strips Corax of all but the authorship of a handbook defining rhetoric
and analyzing the form of the juridicial oration on the one hand and, on the
other, some sort of preoccupation with arguments based on probability
** Contrast the concluding reference to the "how" in Marcellinus (tci \i.ipr\ nevxe xox>
Xoyov, echoing nevte 6e eioi tiva TiepiCTraxiKa five lines earlier [p. 271. 21-26 Rabe =
rV 13. 19-25 Walz]) with its counterpart in Troilus (5ia xcijv eTtivoriGevxojv aiixciv
fiepcbv xo\i Xoyou taking up the earlier 6ia xoiv nevxe JtepiaxaxiKoiv [p. 52. 20-27 Rabe
= VI 49. 15-20 Walz]). Note also that Troilus does not mention the six-part "how" known
to Syrianus {ad Hermogenem 2, p. 39. 17-19 Rabe)
—
perhaps because it has no parallel in
either of the divisiones found in the branch of the Prolegomena tradition to which he and
Marcellinus belong.
*^ Cic. De inv. 1. 51. 97; cf. Radermacher (above, note 7) 414 n. 2.
*^Rhet. 1. 1. 1354al2 and b23. Cf. in MarceUinus (p. 271. 2-3 Rabe = IV 13. 1-2
Walz) the unintelligible phrase Kai x6 xoi 7tpdYjiaxo<; Sitiyeixai (a definition of what the
parekbasis does). Here the simplest emendation is an inserted Ttpo (Rabe) or (more in line
with the meaning of parekbasis) e^co or eicxoq. Either of the latter would result in a
duplication (xa (e^to) xow npayfiaxcq) or approximation of Aristotle's own phrase.
*^ That either Hermagoras or Marcellinus took his pentad from the Rhet. ad Alex.—or
earlier texts drawn on by iu author—is unlikely, given the different terminology used
there for the five parts (proem, diegesis, bebaiosis, la pros tous anlidikous, and palillogia)
and the fundamenully different character of the section corresponding to parekbasis: an
anticipation of one's opponent's arguments, not a digression into ad hominem
irrelevance.
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should be revised in favor of one which leaves him with nothing but the
latter. And Timaeus' role should be similarly reduced—to that of (at most)
replacing Aristotle's dicanic context for Corax's invention of rhetoric with a
political one: the situation following the fall of the Syracusan tyrants when
ETiETioXa^e , . . br\\iay(iiyG)v 7iA,f|9o(; . . . Kal Xoyo-u 6eiv6TTi(; vnb
xwv veoneptov TioKeixo (Diodorus 11. 87. 5). Diodorus may well derive
at this point from a Timaean account in which Corax was named as one of
the plethos or, more likely, as the first teacher of logon deinotes to the
young; but his political preeminence, before and after the revolution, and his
role as discoverer and definer of rhetoric and its basic parts, make far more
sense as inseparable components of a coherent foundation myth than either
does as the invention of a Sicilian historian.'**
As for Corax himself, or what is left of him, it is natural to wonder
whether continued existence in histories of ancient rhetoric is desirable at
all, stripped as he has been of most of the choregia—offices, political
status, pupils, progeny intellectual and literary—without which living, or at
any rate living well, is impossible. Antiquity records, to my knowledge,
only one other Corax from the historical period: the man who killed the
poet Archilochus in a battle fought on the island of Naxos at some point
toward the middle of the seventh century."*^ Plutarch, along with Aelian (fr.
80 Hercher) and, later, the Suda {s.v. 'Apxi^oxoq), says that Corax was an
epithet: The man's real name seems (eoikev) to have been Calandes.^^ One
naturally wonders how Plutarch came to be informed so exactly on such a
matter
—
probably not through independent research into the prosopography
of seventh-century Naxos. Name as well as epithet may have been preserved
on some document kept in the Archilocheum on Paros and available for
consulation there. It is just as likely, however—since the real name merely
"seems" to have been Calandes—that Plutarch (or his source) found earlier
accounts in disagreement on this point^' and simply assumed on the basis of
^* Those inclined to go along with V. Farenga's deconstructionist reading of the myth
("Periphrasis on the Origin of Rhetoric." Modern Language Notes 94 [1979] 1033-53)
will have even less reason to attribute any of it to Sicilian invention. Essential to
Farenga's interpretation is the story
—
present in two Prolegomena (Rabe 4, pp. 24. 16-
25. 3 and 17, pp. 269. 25-270. 3 = VI 11. 12-12. 5 and IV 11. 18-24 Walz)—of how
Hieron's suppression of free speech forced his subjects to communicate through gestures
and dance steps; and this is surely too preposterous, even for Timaeus.
*' Aristotle, fr. 611. 25 Rose = fr. viii (FHG n 214) in the collection of excerpts from
Aristotle's PoUteiai erroneously transmitted under the name Heraclides Ponticus. The
phrase mentioning Corax is missing in some manuscripts, and Rose prints it in his
apparatus, evidently assuming that it has been added from elsewhere to fill a lacuna in the
text of "Heraclides" himself. Cf. Miiller ad loc.
^^De sera num. vind. 17. 325d-e.
'^ Eusebius (Praep. Ev. 5. 93. 9) gives a third variant. Archias (usually assumed to be a
corruption of Kalandas). In other passages mentioning the poet's death (listed in
Lasserre's edition, cvii-cviii) no name is given at all.
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his own experience that Corax had to be the nickname: Greek parents were
not in the habit of calling their children crows.
This rule may have admitted of exceptions in the Sicilian context with
which we are concerned, but assuming an exception in the present case
requires an additional, equally questionable assumption. Would any Greek
named Crow—especially if he were a Siceliot (acuta ilia gens et controversa
naturay^—be ill-advised enough to try to make a living by teaching the art
of public speaking? Even if it did not occur to his compatriots themselves
to identify lessons in eloquence from the Crow with lessons in cawing and
squawking they had only to recollect Pindar's famous lines, from a poem
premiered at Agrigentum in 476 B.C., when Corax was a boy or young
man, in which an unidentified group of lesson-takers—cacophonous rivals
(or, perhaps, inept imitators and explicators) of the poet—are compared to a
pair of crows who chatter fruitlessly against or about the eagle of Zeus
(liaGovxeq . . . KopttKeg co<; aKpavxa yap-uexov Aibq npbc, opvixa, 01.
2. 86-88).
That Pindar's simile is not irrelevant to the tradition about Corax was
surmised over a century ago by Verrall.^^ Verrall's own version of the
connection—that the two crows are literally the "two" Coraxes, Corax and
his pupil Tisias—has the disadvantage of being incompatible, both with the
Pindaric context of the passage^'* and the tradition, at least as old as
Aristotle, which places Corax 's activity as a teacher after the fall of Hieron
and his dynasty (466/5). What the passage does show is how natural it
would have been, in fifth-century Sicily, to associate loud and frequent, or
inept and unwelcome, discourse with the chatter of crows; and so, as a
consequence, how unlikely it is that Corax was anything but a name
bestowed after—not before—its bearer had started to teach people how to
speak.
The epithet may have been totally derisive and contemptuous, or
derisive and affectionate at the same time. The question cannot be answered.
But if one asks what Corax was called before he got his new name, the
answer is almost inevitable: Tisias. Much that is puzzling in the earlier
stages of the tradition is thereby explained—the inability on the part of any
sources earlier than Sextus to distinguish the one figure from the other, the
frequency with which the name Corax carries overtones of uncertainty or
contempt (Coracem istum veterem [Cic. De or. 3. 81], usque a Corace
nescioquo [ibid. 1. 91], ttiv tov Tiaiov texvt|v ... to 6\)OK6paKo<; epyov
'^ Cicero's own explanation {Brut. 46) for why rhetoric should have arisen in Sicily
rather than somewhere else.
^^
"Korax and Tisias." Journal of Philology 9 (1880) 197 ff., developing a suggestion
offered (p. 130) in an earlier article, "TOnOI. TOFIH (?). and TOnAil." published in the
same issue.
^* Whatever the exact point being made, it is clear that the crows in some sense want
their cawing to be attended to along with, or instead of, the eagle's light; and it is hard to
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[Lucian, Pseudolog. 30],^^ xi Gavjiaaxov ei KopaKoq etpe-upovToq rnv
pTiTopiKTiv ol an' EKEivou KopttKcq eloiv;^'^) and—most tellingly per-
haps—the peculiar language in the earliest surviving reference to either man:
5eiva)<; y' eoikev d7iOKeKpi)^in£VTiv texvtiv evpeiv 6 Teioiac; §.
aXXocj POT k; Sr\ nox ' & v t\)yx"^ c*- ^g"'- onoSev y ai pet
ovo^g^o^evo; (Plato, Phdr. 273a).
In the light of the Byzantine tradition and its immediate forerunners,
Socrates' reference at this point to "Tisias or someone else, whoever he is
and whatever he likes to be called" is usually taken, following Hermias,^'' as
a way of indicating that credit for the "art" of Tisias was disputed between
him and another older, more obscure figure. But if the later tradition did not
exist—and there is no independent evidence to suggest that it did exist in
Plato's day—the most natural way of taking the passage would be as a
reference to uncertainty about the identity of Tisias himself, not his
collaborator: "Tisias or whoever else he [the man sometimes known as
Tisias] happens to be and whatever the source of the name he prefers to go
by." One would not necessarily suspect a further, malicious reference to the
fact that anyone in his right mind would prefer not to have got a nickname
in the way Tisias did; but if the nickname was Corax and Plato knew it, the
reference is almost certain to be there. Onomastic precision is surely the
last thing Socrates is aiming at in this passage.^*
That "How to Speak as Taught by Tisias" (r\ xov Tioiov Xoycov xexyTj)
should become so widely known by the alternative title, "How to Speak as
Taught by the Crow" (i] xov KopaKoc; Xoycov xexvTi), as to lead to
ignorance of the author's real name and, later, to positing the existence of
two authors would not be surprising, even today, in certain parts of the
Mediterranean world. And what applies there now applies a fortiori to that
world in antiquity:
see any comparable relationship between Pindaric song and the teachings of Corax and
Tisias.
'^ Lucian's apparent equation of the "art" of Tisias with the activity (ergon) of the
"damnable Crow" is even more suggestive of the view of Corax proposed here, as is
Corax 's appearance as an emblematic corvus atop a standard carried by Tisias at Martianus
Capella 5. 433-34, p. 150 Willis. Both passages, however, are too vaguely allusive to
allow any firm conclusions as to the form in which the story was familiar to their
respective authors.
'^Isocrates' supposed reply (Apophthegmata 8' 1, p. 278 Blass-Benseler) upon being
asked why the populace is in the habit of being robbed and cheated by its rhetors.
" Ad loc., p. 251. 8-9 Couvreur.
** Knowledge of the epithet may also have been one of the things that suggested to
Plato the prominent and contrasting role assigned in the Phaedrus to another famous Tisias
with an alias. Tisias the Chorus-Master—i.e. Stesichorus (cf. the Suda, s.v.)—is as surely
a patron saint of "good" rhetoric in the first part of the dialogue as Tisias the Crow is of
"tad" rtietoric in the second.
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Anyone familiar with the village life of central and southern Italy
knows how difficult it is to identify a person by his name but how easy
it is to locate him through the nickname known to the people of the
area in which he lives
—
from which the author^' rightly concludes, inferring ancient practice from
modem, that the appearance in archaic Greek poetry of what are obviously
redende Namen need not mean that the persons who bear them are fictitious.
Alessandro Manzoni had presumably made the same observation about
village life in the 1820s; and he, too, drew inferences about an earlier period,
when he came to write his famous novel of seventeenth-century Lombardy:
Fate a mio modo [Agnese is launching Renzo on his ill-fated attempt to
seek out the services of a lawyer/rhetdr to counter the designs of Don
Rodrigo] . . . andate a Lecco . . . cercate del dottor Azzecca-
garbugli,^ raccontategli. Ma non lo chiamate cosi, per amor del cielo:
e im soprannome. Bisogna dire il signer dottor— Come si chiama,
ora? Oh to'! non lo so il nome vero: lo chiaman tutti a quel modo.
Basta, cercate di quel dottore alto, asciutto, pelato, col naso rosso, e
una voglia di lampone suUa guancia. . . . quello e una cima d'uomo!
Ho visto io piu d'uno ch'era piii impicciato che un pulcino nella
stoppa, e non sap>eva dove batter la testa, e, dopo essere stato un'ora a
quattr'occhi col dottor Azzecca-garbugli (badate bene di non chiamarlo
cosi!) I'ho visto, dico, ridersene . . . ^'
A certain "tio Buscabeatas, aunque no era este su verdadero nombre ..." is
the protagonist of a story of village life near Cadiz by a Spanish
contemporary of Manzoni*^^—and the examples could doubtless be
multiplied. Tisias was probably as poweriess as Doctor Azzecca-garbugli to
suppress the name to which local reaction to the infancy of rehearsed
courtroom eloquence was condemning him and his fledglings. Only the
published version of his model pieces, informing readers, at least down to
Aristotle's day, of the author's identity, and preserving some true memory
of onoGev xaipei ovo^a^o^ievo^, ultimately saved him from the fate of his
Manzonian counterpart—though at the price of condemning historians of
ancient rhetoric to a bimillenary case of seeing double.
Many of those historians will doubtless continue to prefer the double
vision. But even if they do, they may well find that this "antonomastic"
accounting for Corax is at least ben trovato. What more appropriate fate for
the putative founder of the entire rhetorical tradition, with the centuries-long
^'B. Gentili, Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece (Engl, transl. Baltimore 1988)
294-95.
^° Dr. Shystermeister (lit., "Spy out the ploy") is surely—oTtoGev x"ipei
p.eTa<ppa^6nevo(;—a spiritual as well as onomaslic analogue lo Corax.
^* / promessi sposi, cap. 2.
*^ Pedro AntcKiio de Alarcon, El libro talonario.
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study of figural speech it incorporates, than to be finally revealed as nothing
more—or nothing less—than a figure of speech himself?
Yale University
